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CRITIQUE ARGUMENTS AS POLICY ANALYSIS: 
POLICY DEBATE BEYOND THE RATIONALIST PERSPECTIVE 
Pat J. Gehrke 
Policy is not choking debate. An inflexible, narrowly defined vision of policy threatens debate (Shanahan AS). 
W hile critique arguments were once rare in academic debates, today they are part of nearly every debater' s experience. Contemporary debates frequently grapple with 
arguments that indict or advance values, systems of knowledge, and language choices. It is 
difficult to know whether this growing popularity is due to advances in critique theory, a 
growing dissatisfaction with traditional models of policy debate, or the competitive success 
of critiques in debate. What is apparent in debate literature and discussion is that a 
substantial amount of controversy still exists about the saliency of critiques to academic 
policy debate. Some policy debate advocates claim there is no place for critiques in the 
comparison of policy options, while advocates of critiques often consider such arguments 
broader than a policy perspective, arguing that critics should consider critiques before 
resolving policy questions. Whether one subscribes to Roger Solt's view that "the kritik is 
on balance bad for debate" (Anti-Kritik ii) or William Shanahan's view that "kritiks allow 
debate access to another of its fundamental assumptions" (AS), it is clear that at least for the 
near future critiques will playa major role in the practice of academic policy debate. 
At this point, the controversy over critique argumentation is at an impasse. Both sides 
of this controversy marginalize critique arguments by positioning them outside of policy 
deliberation. The predominate notion among both supporters and opponents of critiques is 
that they are argued as a sidebar to the policy debate. While I am sympathetic to, and often 
agree with, the philosophical potential envisioned by those who endorse critique arguments, 
their reasoning often fails to address the questions raised by those who doubt the role of 
critiques in policy debate. We cannot transcend these differences without repositioning the 
relationship between critique arguments and policy deliberation. This essay contends that 
meaningful policy evaluation often includes arguments similar to those labeled "critiques" 
in academic debate. Specifically, it argues that critique arguments, rather than serving as a 
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priori or tangential issues, are relevant dimensions of policy analysis and should be treated 
as substantive issues in policy debate. 
The idea that the issues raised by critique arguments are relevant to the substance of 
policy disputes is consistent with arguments made by innovative policy analysts and policy 
scholars. Many policy theorists argue for including in the policy discussion process 
arguments that mirror certain forms of critique argumentation. This position may seem 
unusual, given that some debate theorists tend to believe that policy analysis excludes 
critique arguments (Jinks A 14; Shors and Mancuso A 15; Solt, Anti-Kritik xxiii; Solt, 
"Demystifying" A9). However, a considerable body of policy studies literature clearly 
supports the inclusion of critiques based upon competing value orientations and critiques 
based upon the communicative aspects of the policy process. 
The Status of Critique Arguments in Academic Debate 
In contemporary academic debate, critique arguments encompass a wide range of 
philosophical issues. Shanahan originally focused on the German existential philosopher 
Martin Heidegger's call to explore how we think about being in the world. This continental 
pedigree gave rise to the commonly used German spelling, kritik. Shanahan contends that 
traditional policy debate "functions on a foundation of unquestioned assumptions" (A4). 
He calls for debaters to advance arguments that can uncover and investigate these 
assumptions. Shanahan holds that the focus ought not be on the results of such a 
questioning, but rather that the process of thinking and questioning itself is to be valued 
(A4). Since Shanahan, debaters have expanded critiques from their existential origins to 
include a broad diversity of philosophical and political perspectives. Recent critiques have 
been based on Riane Eisler's feminist anthropology, Herbert Marcuse's theory of repressive 
desublimation, Immanuel Kant ' s categorical imperative, and Ayn Rand's objectivism. 
A second origin of critique argumentation is Kenneth Broda-Bahm' s theory of the 
language-linked value objection, or "language critique." Broda-Bahrn indicts academic 
debate for operating under the assumption that language is transparent and purely 
referential. He uses Ludwig Wittgenstein' s theory of language games to argue that words 
and their use have effects, and that critics should consider objections to certain language 
choices when adjudicating debates. As originally conceived, the language-linked value 
objection focused "more directly on the actual language practices of an opponent" (Bahrn 
69). Broda-Bahm gives language critiques primacy as voting issues because they make 
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claims to immediate and tangible impacts that "uniquely happen as a direct result of our 
advocacy" (Bahm 76). More recently, theorists and debaters have fashioned critiques 
involving such diverse arguments as evidence challenges, morality arguments, and 
objections to particular styles of delivery (Berube, "Kritiks"). 
For the purposes of this essay, critiques conveniently may be divided into three 
argument forms : value critiques, epistemology critiques, and language critiques. This 
classification system is relatively common in critique literature. David Berube refers to 
ideational (value), thinking (epistemology), and language critiques ("Criticizing" 68). Solt 
separates critiques into practical philosophical critiques (value), pure philosophical 





classification schemes are neither universal nor comprehensive, they are functional for .... 
discussing the relationship between critique argumentation and policy deliberation. 
Value critiques establish or indict value systems or advance ethical or moral claims. 
These take the shape of deontological critiques, decision rules, value hierarchies, ethics 
violations, and moral obligations. When an affirmative claims a moral obligation to 
implement their policy, they are advancing value arguments in an attempt to justify their 
policy position. Likewise, these arguments are frequently advanced by negatives 
contending that an affirmative's proposed policy is discriminatory (i.e., racist, patriarchal, 
heterosexist, etc.) or morally unacceptable as a COurse of action (such as the pacifist's 
opposition to committing violent acts). Value critiques were the stock and trade of "value" 
debate, usually referred to as criteria and value objections arguments (Zarefsky IS). 
Epistemology critiques establish or indict means of creating or finding truths. These 
include arguments such as Paul Feyerabend's critique of scientific method and Murray 
Edelman's theory of enemy construction. Epistemology critiques predominantly question 
the reliability of particular methods of making predictive and descriptive claims inherent in 
a particular policy advocacy. Every policy case advances causal and predictive claims. 
These claims are each the result of a particular way of coming to or creating knowledge, 
such as laboratory study, romantic introspection, field research, or humanist investigation. 
Epistemology critiques indict a method of coming to or creating knowledge, thus 
undercutting the claims derived through that method. The best of these critiques will also 
advance an alternative knowledge system that produces results contrary to the claims 
advanced in the opponent's positions. 
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Language critiques can be differentiated from value and epistemology critiques in two 
respects. First, they focus upon communicative or interpretive aspects of either particular 
word choices or the broader advocacy of debaters. Language critiques indict what an 
advocate communicates, intentionally or otherwise, and what others who endorse that 
advocacy might communicate. Debaters have called these arguments language-linked value 
objections, language objections, language critiques, advocacy critiques, advocacy-linked 
disadvantages, and a host of other names. Second, the most controversial element that 
differentiates these arguments from other objections to policy advocacy is the claim that 
their implications supersede the impacts of particular policy actions. Advocates of language 
critiques often claim fiat to be illusory, that language creates reality, or that advocacy has 
"real-world" or "in-round" effects upon critics, debaters, and others. For example, a 
language critique might argue that an opponent has employed sexist language, such as using 
"mankind" as an androgynous term. The team advancing the critique may argue that a critic 
who fails to reject the sexist language likewise advocates using sexist language, and 
consequently perpetuates and reinforces sexism in the culture. Conversely, the policy 
issues debated are only fictions or imaginations used to simulate a policy decision in the 
debate. In actuality, when the critic votes, no policy is enacted. Yet, the critique 
proponents argue, the effects of the language are real and immediate. Thus, the debaters 
ask the critic to ignore the illusory or imagined impacts of the proposed policies and decide 
the debate based upon the real and immediate impacts of language. 
Some critiques, such as Critical Race Theory, cross these categories. Since Critical 
Race Theory indicts the American legal system for being racist, which makes its predictive 
and descriptive claims inaccurate, it combines a value critique and an epistemological 
critique. Similarly, debaters sometimes combine value arguments with language critiques to 
create a dual set of impacts for their positions. With the sexism example previously 
discussed, the critiquing team may add an argument that says that individuals have a moral 
obligation to reject sexism when they encounter it. Thus, in addition to the language 
critique of the use of the term "mankind," the critiquing team would also advance a value 
critique, holding that there is an obligation to reject sexism. The distinctions between 
value, epistemology, and language critiques are not always clean, and may leave out some 
critique arguments. Critique argumentation is in a constant state of mutation as debaters 
find new ways to think about particular issues. The classification scheme used here should 
be considered functional only for the purposes of this discussion. 
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One of the primary CrIticisms leveled against all such critiques is that they fail to 
address policy questions (Jinks A14; Shors and Mancuso A15; Solt, Anti-Kritik xiii; Solt, 
"DemystifYing" A9). Most debate theorists who oppose critique arguments advance a 
rationalist paradigm of policy evaluation. In their minds, a strict cost-benefit analysis, 
particularly a quantitative analysis based on the preservation of human life, is the only 
means by which an advocate can justifY or dejustifY a policy. In his criticism of scientific 
models of public policy, Robert Formaini, the former vice president for public policy at the 
Cato Institute, explains the rationalist policy paradigm: 
According to the policy rationalist, if the risks are "acceptable" and the "benefits" 
are greater than "costs," what person can argue that the proposed policy ought not 
be done, and on what inductive basis? It will not work to say that the proposed 
policy is "wrong," "immoral," "unjust," and a "waste of time and effort." These 
arguments are "unscientific" and "value-laden" with the citizen's personal, 
irrational prejudices. (69) 
In policy debate, the rationalist perspective marginalizes critiques by mistakenly 
representing a particular approach to policy evaluation as the essential means of policy 
deliberation, implying that one theoretical perspective is both appropriate for all policy 
questions and preferable to all other means of policy comparison. 
Marouf Hasian and Edward Panetta argue that "both the promise and the peril of the 
critique come from its use as a method of questioning some of the assumptions behind 
'policy' debate itself' (47). They continue, "the use of 'the critique' in policy debate means 
a virtual abandonment of many of the cherished assumptions of policy decision making" 
(53). If by policy debate and policy decision making, Hasian and Panetta are referring only 
to the conventional practices of academic debate, they would be correct. However, their 
criticism is not that critiques simply challenge academic policy debate as we commonly 
practice it, but rather that critiques are "politically irrelevant and counterproductive" (54). 
This conclusion is arrived at by giving primacy to rationalist policy models, including 
claims such as that "debating is an inherently rationalistic activity" (54). 
Faith in rationalism as the core element of policy debate leads Derek Jinks to posit that 
if critiques have any theoretical legitimacy, "they should take the form of disadvantages, 
counterplans, solvency arguments, etc." (AI4). links argues that resolutions imply the 
context for academic debates, and since contemporary resolutions are interpreted as policy 




reasoning may bear some merit, Jinks begs the question of whether the rationalist model is 
the only possible policy perspective. Jinks relies on a rationalist cost-benefit analysis model 
for decision making. He argues that policy decisions cannot be made without comparing 
unique costs and benefits of proposed courses of action (A 14). Jinks likewise contends that 
policy debate should begin from a set of shared assumptions about the values at stake, 
which should simply be taken as true (Al3). 
Matthew Shors and Steve Mancuso propose an extreme division between critiques and 
policy discourse. Shorsand Mancuso make the same error as Jinks · by generalizing from 
rationalist policy models to all policy deliberation. They claim that critiques are "utterly 
irrelevant" and that critiques ask us to believe that "it is pointless to discuss policies" (A16). 
Shors and Mancuso would have us believe that critiques "ignore policy issues altogether" 
(A16). It is because critiques do not argue unique commensurable costs or benefits that 
they contend that critiques carry "little, if any, weight in policy comparison" (AI6). Only 
by failing to recognize the broad diversity of policy perspectives can Shors and Mancuso 
come to conclude that "the Critique is wholly incompatible with, and non-germane to, 
policy debate" (A 17). 
Perhaps the most vehement opponent of critiques has been Solt. Solt makes many of 
the same assumptions about policy analysis as do Jinks, Shors, and Mancuso. Solt so 
strongly believes that critiques challenge the assumption that "what we are essentially 
engaged in is a policy debate" that he recommends the first response to critiques be to 
reestablish the policy framework ("Demystifying" A9). For Solt, "the kl'itik is a non-policy 
argument" (Anti-hitik ii). He sees debate as a policy forum, and critiques are considered 
not to be "germane to the subject at hand" (Anli-Kl'itik xxii). Solt argues that "at root, the 
kritik misunderstands the nature of the policy calculus" (Anti-Kritik x:xiii) . Solt's rationalist 
assumptions are apparent in arguments encouraging us to "take an a priori ethical and 
political framework for granted" ("De mystifying" A II). Similarly, he ignores a whole body 
of interpretive and communicative policy analysis literature when he claims that "ideas are 
more important than the rhetoric with which they are expressed" ("Demystifying" All). 
Here, Solt is attempting to refute language critiques by retreating to a separation of policies 
and the words that express, present, and form those policies. For So It, the policy has a pure 
form outside of language, and it is that form that is to be evaluated, rather than any of the 
words that might malign it. Such a position is distant from much of both contemporary 
communication studies and policy studies literature. 
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The arguments against critiques advanced by the policy debate rationalists are suspect 
because they are grounded in the traditions of academic debate rather than contemporary 
theories of policy studies. Consequently, they dismiss questions they can not force-fit into 
policy rationalism as neither worthwhile nor relevant to policy discussions. As two policy 
analysts wrote of the hegemony of the rationalist paradigm, "When all you have is a 
hammer the whole world looks like a nail" (House and Shull 163-164). 
Berube attacks critiques from a perspective not overtly founded on policy rationalism, 
holding that critiques are fundamentally pre-fiat arguments and that they disregard post-fiat 
substantive claims ("Criticizing" 68-72). Nonetheless, he bases his arguments upon similar 
assumptions about the relationship between critiques and policy debate. Here, "fiat" is a 
stand-in for "policy focus," in that fiat represents an enacted policy. To claim that critiques 
disregard issues that arise after fiat is to claim that they disregard questions raised by 
enacting policies. 
Berube's argument is also predicated upon the assumption that academic debate should 
extend no further than "intentional, intended, naIve, objective, and rogate" meanings 
("Criticizing" 77). This means that debaters and critics should not question any of the 
assumptions or presuppositions of texts or advocacies, uncritically accepting the premises 
inherent in propositions. In the context of policy analysis, Berube ' s standards require that 
policy advocates and analysts not ask of each other: "But what are your assumptions? Are 
they valid, or consistent, or morally acceptable?" This position is extraordinarily 
dangerous. Wayne Booth argues that we must consider precisely those questions texts 
attempt to foreclose: 
Each literary work implicates within itself a set of norms about what questions are 
appropriate. Hemingway, to choose a favorite example of the new feminist critics, 
does not demand of us that we ask of his works, "Is it good for men or women to 
accept uncritically my machismo bravado?" Indeed, he seems to work quite hard to 
prevent our asking such a question. But surely, the feminist critics say, and I think 
they are right, surely any teacher who teaches A Farewell to Arms without inviting, 
somewhere along the line, a critical consideration of Hemingway's heroes as human 
ideals, and of his portraits of women as reflecting a peculiarly maimed creative 
vision, and of his vision of the good life as a singularly immature one-surely any 
such teacher is doing only half the job. (301) 
. . ;
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. Similarly, we might say that any policy debater who does not seek a critical 
consideration of the questions that a policy proposal tries to foreclose is only doing half the 
job of a policy analyst. 
Additionally, Berube assumes that we have pure and direct knowledge of the meanings 
of a text. However, in order to understand the meanings of a text we must interpret that 
text. When advocates speak, we inevitably interpret what they say. Meanings are found in 
the act of interpretation, and those meanings differ, at least slightly, between interpretations. 
There is virtually no text in a debate that can inspire one universally agreed upon 
interpretation. As listeners and readers, we can never find ourselves at a point where the 
intentional, naive, and rogate meanings of a text are objectively transparent to us. 
Determining what questions a text invites requires interpreting the text, and these 
interpretations will vary, producing contrary readings of what questions may be asked of 
that text. There is no way to reconcile interpretations objectively. In order to evaluate 
competing interpretations, one would have to engage in precisely the critical textual 
analysis Berube attempts to foreclose. Since every interaction with a text is interpretive, 
Berube's objective standard for encountering a text never can be met. 
While opponents of critiques might be expected to position critiques outside of policy 
discussion, some advocates of critique arguments in debate have done the same. Many · 
critique proponents advance either the position that we should not consider ourselves policy 
analysts (Berube, "Kritiks" 21), or that critiques supersede policy questions (Bahm 76; 
Broda-Bahm and Murphy 21). These arguments unwittingly lend assistance to opponents of 
critiques by disconnecting critique arguments from policy discourse. Stepping outside the 
policy focus is not inviting to those who hold resolutely to a policy perspective; rationalist 
or otherwise. Rather, it makes it all the more difficult to recognize the unique role critique 
arguments can play in the enhancement of policy analysis and policy debate. 
Broda-Bahm probably has done more to popularize language critiques than any other 
theorist, but he clearly positions these arguments outside of policy deliberation. Broda-
Bahm and Thomas Murphy define a critique as "any argument which does not provide an 
answer to the resolutional question" (21). In this context, they refer to "the resolutional 
question" not merely as the resolution itself, but as the affirmative case which advocates it 
(31 n3). They make the same assumption often used as a premise against critiques, that we 
can and should separate policies from the language that advances them. Broda-Bahm 
separates policy and language by arguing that critiques do not answer substantive advocacy, 
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but rather focus "more directly on the actual language practices of an opponent" (Bahrn 69). 
This is reinforced with attempts to give primacy to the "more immediate and more tangible" 
effects of language by claiming policy proposals to be fictions of debate rounds (Bahm 76). 
While positioning critiques outside of policy discourse is a common error amongst 
critique advocates, Shanahan is an exception. Much of Shanahan's essay is esoteric and 
philosophical, but he does recognize at least a potential for critiques to be a part of policy 
analysis. Making use of literature about development assistance, Shanahan considers "the 
possibility that the kritik is policy debate" (A8). Shanahan was nearest the mark when he 
claimed that "the kritik supplements, not supplants current debate practice" (A4). However, 
critique proponents have either ignored or simply reiterated these claims, and opponents of 
critique argumentation scoff at Shanahan's conception of policy analysis. Most likely, this 
is because Shanahan's theory is so deeply embedded in Heidegger's philosophy that it is 
difficult to read a policy focus beneath the existential vocabulary. This may also be because 
neither proponents nor opponents of critique argumentation have considered the policy 
studies literature that reinforces the need for critiques in policy discussions. If one truly 
takes a policy perspective toward debate, one inevitably finds that critique argumentation is 
a necessary element of policy evaluation. 
The impasse hence arises because opponents of critiques hold that the purpose of debate 
is to discuss policies exclusively, and assume that policy rationalism is the only mechanism 
debaters can use to do so. Many proponents of critiques maintain the impasse by arguing 
that critiques somehow supersede or exist outside of policy argumentation. The 
marginalization performed by both sides of this controversy disconnects critique 
argumentation from politics, policy deliberation, and real world debates. To move past the 
impasse and integrate critique argumentation and policy deliberation, we must reposition 
critiques within the spectrum of policy analysis. 
Transcending Rationalism 
Policy studies literature is a useful aide to those seeking to understand the relationship 
between policy, values, and communication. The applicability of policy literature to 
academic debate depends, to some extent, upon the purposes and goals of debate. One of 
the primary goals of debate is to foster better thinkers, better decision-makers, and 
responsible citizens. That contemporary debate focuses upon questions of public policy 





conscIOusness. As citizens and consumers, we are all, at least indirectly, policy makers. 
Oddly enough, in an attack upon the theoretical legitimacy of critiques Solt argues exactly 
this point: 
It is through the process of making the judgments that our moral and political 
worldviews are developed. The judgments we come to at the end of debate rounds 
may only be provisional, based on the evidence and arguments in that round, but 
over time the sum of our provisional judgments is what ultimately constitutes our 
moral and political belief system. Policy debates are important. As citizens in a 
democracy, we have individually small but collectively large inputs into the policies 
our government chooses. And even if our own input into the policy process is 
small, we live (as Bob Dylan says) "in a political world," and to keep our bearings 
in that world, we need to make some informed judgments about what we believe. 
("De mystifying" A9-1 0) 
While contemporary academic debate is largely engaged in training students to think 
about and advocate policy options, this is also the domain of policy studies. Debaters do 
the work of policy analysts in their day-to-day debating. They research issues, construct 
and analyze problems, and propose and oppose courses of action. Policy studies theorists 
use political philosophy and other disciplines to generate constructive and critical thought 
about policy choices and advocacy, and policy analysts often perform in adversarial or 
debate formats where they advocate for particular interests or issues. 
In a widely used policy analysis text, David Weimer and Aidan Vining isolate three 
roles that policy analysts play when they approach a policy question : the objective 
technician, the client's advocate, and the issue advocate (17-18). Objective technicians 
position themselves as unbiased arbiters of the public good, advocating policy options based 
purely on objective analysis. However, since personal histories and cultural locations 
influence them, it is impossible to consider any analyst truly objective. Client's advocates 
construct policy analyses and advocate policy options that benefit their clients. Issue 
advocates construct policy analyses and advocate policy options to advance their particular 
issues or causes. Most policy analysts reject the role of the objective technician, claiming 
to be client or issue advocates who, much like lawyers, construct arguments for particular 
points of view (Durning and Osuna 649; Majone 21). Academic debaters can be likened to 
issue advocates, making arguments for their side of a policy issue. 
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Policy studies literature is not alien to academic debate. Don Brownlee and Mark 
Crossman used policy studies literature as the grounding for their discussion of the use of 
cost-benefit analysis in academic debate. Some policy theorists have even initiated an 
argumentative turn in policy studies, citing argumentation and debate literature in their 
attempts to apply argumentation theory to policy studies (Dunn; MacRae). While classical 
academic debate has limited policy argumentation to a rationalist perspective, a broader 
perspective on policy deliberation invites the incorporation of critiques. 
Critiques and Policy Criteria 
One form of critique is the advocacy of value positions. These arguments may critique 
the results produced by a policy option or they may focus upon an evaluation of a policy 
option as an act, independent of the results. Either way, these arguments introduce into the 
deliberations another way to compare claims to value advanced by competing policy 
advocates. In many ways, these arguments attempt to establish value hierarchies similar to 
the criteria arguments that were common in the Cross Examination Debate Association 
during the 1980s. Often referred to as "value" or "non-policy" debate, many of these 
debates fundamentally dealt with policy issues. The primary difference was that debaters 
advanced explicit value models to justify their policy positions. While still about public 
policy, these debates embraced a multiple theory perspective on the possible benefits that 
could justify or indict a policy. These debates not only engaged in descriptive and 
predictive arguments about policies, they investigated what values policies should seek to 
realize and the means acceptable to accomplish those ends. Today, policy debate has 
jettisoned the explicit discussion of values and morality in favor of a rationalist policy 
perspective. 
Policy narratives both rely upon and reinforce basic value assumptions about human 
beings and the world that we construct. If we fail to take value assumptions and 
implications into account, we cannot consider that we have a meaningful analysis of a 
policy question. Connie Bullis and James Kennedy note that policy analysts too often 
ignore values because of rational models of policy evaluation (543). The primacy of the 
rational model of policy evaluation similarly undercuts academic debate's ability to 
consider policy options. Garry Brewer, a policy scholar at Yale, and Peter deLeon, a policy 
analyst for the RAND Corporation, note that theories and models for social description and 
policy choice involve making value judgments (135-137). 
.. 
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The long term implications of any policy option are perhaps best reflected by the value 
systems that support them and the options they reflect and reinforce (Bullis and Kennedy 
543). When one implements a policy, one also implements a value system. While the 
implementation and technical aspects of the policy may shift through agency and 
interpretation, the fundamental core value assumptions of the policy may be more enduring 
and have broader implications. The intrinsic connection between values and policies were 
not ignored by early non-policy debate theorists. For instance, David Zarefsky's notes the 
importance of criteria for the evaluation of quasi-policy propositions (9-10) and Jan 
Vasil ius comments that "values precede policy formation, influence policy implementation 
and assess policy results" (35). 
Policy debate that fails to incorporate value discussions may be deceptive and 
misleading. A belief in the ability of humans to produce an analysis of human interaction 
not laden with values can only be a grave self-deception. Value-free policy analysis is 
neither possible nor useful. This is in part because both policy analysts and policy makers 
inextricably inhabit "a world structured by values" (Vickers 95). Thus, as one sets forth to 
clarifY and evaluate options, one inevitably ends up clarifYing and ordering values. This is 
especially true in policy debate, where the entire argument rests fundamentally on some 
conception of what is the public good. 
Thus, it is inevitable in debates over policy options that we engage in the construction 
of value systems and moral premises . The real question is whether we should do such a 
priori, behind a veil of objectivity, or as a part of the subject of the debate itself. The latter 
alternative is far preferable. No strict ethical rule or community standard can replace debate . 
about value choices. Nor can the policy rationalist perspective account for value choices. 
The policy rationalist relies upon methods such as cost-benefit analysis to strive for 
scientific objectivity and authority in policy evaluation. Brownlee and Crossman note that 
cost-benefit analysis is unable to incorporate value conflicts into policy deliberations 
because cost-benefit analysis relies upon objective commensurable measurements that are 
often not possible with values (4-6). Rationalist policy analysts "either omit certain values 
or force them into inappropriate comparisons" (Brownlee and Crossman 6). 
It would be a grave mistake to push normative value considerations out of the debate 
round and behind some mystical curtain. As one senior policy analyst put it, "Simply, 
values are too central to the various stages of the policy process to permit them to be 
covertly inserted, neglected, or left to some hidden marginalist hand 'muddling through'" 
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(deLeon 39). We can reasonably expect to find our way through such issues only if we 
continually open them to discussion and include them in policy deliberations. We should 
consider that public policies and policy debates are about things that are happening. Debate 
is not fiction. The evidence and advocacies of our authors do not mystically originate in a 
vacuum, nor do they come from some entity creating game pieces for our amusement. It is 
essential that as policy advocates and analysts we not lose sight of these normative roots. 
Critiques and Interpretive Analysis 
Not all critique arguments focus on value hierarchies. There is a general trend toward 
critiques focused on values implicit in the arguments advocates construct or the ways they 
are expressed. Similar movements in policy studies to incorporate interpretive theories and 
theories of communicative action have begun to overturn the presumption that a policy 
communicates only its own implementation. Interpretive perspectives on policy offer 
unique advantages in repairing our policy deliberation model, as well as the pedagogical 
benefits of deeper understanding of both specific policies and the policy process. It is 
important that we not think of policies in purely rational modes, but realize what we say 
through them to others and ourselves. Policy discourse and policies themselves can have 
profound communicative implications from the beginning to the end of the policy cycle. 
Since public policy is by definition interactive (that is, it must occur between people), 
policies have no option but to exist predominantly as communicative events. As a society 
"we live in and are confined to a communicated and communicable world" (Vickers 25), 
and we can not separate our policy options from the communicative acts they represent and 
the communications by which we represent them. The existence of the resolution itself and 
an affirmative team's operationalization of that resolution are profoundly communicative. 
Policy scholar James Rogers argues that policy advocacy can alter belief systems, 
provide new paradigms, have an agenda setting effect, affect how policy issues are 
problematized, and change the way solutions are viewed and evaluated (22-27). Policy 
discourse begins, as do most affirmative cases, with an explication of the problems with 
existing policies. However, practical problems must be constructed, interpreted, and made 
sense of in the complex contexts at hand (Forester, "No Planning" 60). Hence, debaters as 
policy evaluators and advocates begin by problematizing the status quo. This act 
simultaneously creates some identities and roles while negating others. It communicates 
not only a what, but also a who, a why, and much more. The first impact of any affirmative 
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case is to mark and modify the social and political world. Policy discourse communicates 
values and interpretations about a policy, its subjects, the objects it acts upon, and the world 
in which advocates seek to implement it. These communications shape the way that agents 
implement or carry out those policies (Bullis and Kennedy 543). Cornell professor of city 
and regional planning John Forester argues that public policies "alter the 'communicative 
infrastructure' of institutions that mediate between structural processes of social learning 
and the practical, situated claims-making process of social interaction" (Critical Theory 
146). 
Thus, as policy analysts and policy makers, debaters and critics must explore 
methodologies that can account for the communicative impact of policy discourse. Initially 
we may find such an approach in an interpretive perspective on policy. An interpretive 
approach to policy analysis focuses on the meanings of policies, on the values, feelings, 
and/or beliefs that they express, and on the processes by which those meanings are 
communicated to and interpreted by various audiences (Yanow 8-9). From this view, 
debaters may look to policy discourse as a rhetorical artifact subject to critical rhetorical 
analysis or similar analyses. 
We can not neatly separate policies from the language and advocacy that brings about 
their implementation. Policies communicate both through action and through the arguments 
which advocate action. In light of the nationalist and racist rhetoric of extreme anti-
immigration politicians, we should not be surprised to hear of border patrol officers abusing 
non-white people at the U. S. borders. Or, consider what the United States communicated 
through the Tuskegee experiments. Over 20 years after the conclusion of the Tuskegee 
study, what it communicated and continues to communicate about the attitudes of 
governments and medical institutions toward blacks is still having profound impacts. AIDS 
education program developers have found that the Tuskegee experiment left a legacy which 
leads many blacks, especially in the rural south, to believe, "that HfV ... was deliberately 
created to kill black people, that AZT ... was a plot to poison them, that condom 
distribution was part of a government plan to reduce the number of black births and that 
needle exchange programs were designed to foment drug use in minority communities" 
(Stryker E4). 
Arguably, some policies may intend no more than their implementation. However, that 
does not free such policies from responsibility for far more than they intend. While 
methods for considering these interpretive and communicative aspects of a policy are 
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beyond the rationalist perspective, any evaluation of policy options must consider these 
communicative perspectives. To limit these interpretations to the intentional and the naIve 
is to limit policy discourse and policy analysis, destroying our ability to consider the 
communicative effects and influences of policy advocacy. In her analysis of the published 
reports of the Tuskegee study, Martha Solomon notes that one reason the Tuskegee 
experiment continued for as long as it did was that the rhetorical conventions of the 
scientific community obscured and encouraged neglect of crucial human concerns (243-
244). Her focus necessarily extends far beyond the intentional, naIve, rogate meanings of 
the Tuskegee texts. While recognizing these language choices were not intentional attempts 
to deceive or manipulate, Solomon accounts for their occurrence and impact upon the policy 
process. Attempts at similar analysis of proposed policies might act as a check against 
policy actions such as the Tuskegee study. 
Ignorance of these aspects of policy analysis may persuade debaters that policies that 
meet rational cost-benefit criteria are always the most effective and preferential policy 
options, regardless of how they characterize individuals or communicate roles and 
obligations. Similarly, it will leave debaters unable to account for the often enduring and 
dramatic effects of the communicative aspects of policies and policy advocacy. 
Implications of Critiques as Policy Analysis 
These two views of critique arguments -- critiques as policy criteria and critiques as 
interpretive policy analysis -- expand our conceptions of policy debate by demonstrating the 
roles of critiques in policy discourse. Some may find the implications of these views 
uncomfortable. Policy analysis critiques should not replace all other theories of critique 
argumentation or methods of policy analysis. Rather, this theory expands the ways that we 
can think about and discuss policies. Any debater, theorist, coach, or critic who advocates a 
policy fOCllS has little theoretical basis from which to exclude critique argumentation from 
their decision making process. The further one entrenches oneself in the policy literature 
the more necessary critiques become. 
Time is always at a premium in debate rounds, and debaters may already feel they are 
dealing with too many issues. However, we should remember that there was a time when 
debates moved, in general , much slower and included a justification of decision criteria in 
the affirmative case in addition to the requisite policy evaluation. Constrained by time, 
some debates will focus more on policy instrumentalities, some more on competing values, 
· ~ ; 
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and" some more on communicative implications. This is simply a reflection of the fact that 
the art of policy analysis "lies in realizing when inadequate data or social values other than 
efficiency make the narrow benefit-cost approach inappropriate" (Weimer and Vining 311). 
Critiques enhance our current model of policy discourse and can improve our ability to 
perform policy evaluation and advocacy. 
A caveat here must be that viewing critiques as a dimension of policy analysis does not 
seem to provide a model from which we may comfortably evaluate arguments that critique 
the policy focus. Arguments that question the project of policy making may be ill-suited to 
the perspective of critiques as policy analysis. We should not indict or reject critiques that 
we can not frame as policy analysis. Rather, these positions simply must ground their 
relationship to policy advocacy in something other than the models outlined here. 
However, the vast majority of critiques do not break with the assumption that we are 
debating about what we should do. Whether one critiques patriarchy, statism, legal 
objectivism, modernism, essentialist ontology, democracy, capitalism, or a host of other 
subjects, these arguments most often attempt to shape our actions -- our personal, social, 
and political policies. 
Repositioning critiques within the realm of policy analysis provides an opportunity to 
overturn some common assumptions about critiques found in claims made by both 
proponents and opponents of critique argumentation. Perhaps most disturbing to some is 
that incorporating critiques into policy analysis revokes their status as a priori issues. 
However, we should resist so privileging any argument form. Placing critiques before all 
other arguments generates a structure that stultifies and stagnates the critical investigation 
of issues. Instead, we should place specific arguments in contingent hierarchies for the 
purpose of evaluation in a particular debate. Critiques are additional methodologies for 
discussing our shared world and shared action -- the realm of policy debate. Hence, the 
implications of a particular critique for a particular decision should be grounded in the 
particular arguments advanced in that particular debate. 
Accepting critiques as a part of policy analysis may help us to redefine the relationship 
between debate and politics. Even the most radically esoteric critique arguments may be 
deeply political, and positioning critiques as policy analysis asks us to think of ourselves as 
policy analysts and policy makers. This very proposition politicizes debate and revives the 
reality of the debate forum. Thinking of debate and critiques as policy advocacy, policy 
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analysis, and pol icy making explodes the distinction between debate and the "real world" by 
erasing the fictionality of debate rounds. 
Once debaters and critics recognize themselves as real citizen/policy makers rather than 
imagined governmental bodies, they will find it more difficult to exclude values, ethics, and 
morals from their decisions. Critique opponents may argue this personalizes the politics of 
debate, making decisions more arbitrary or dependent upon a critic's subjective value 
system. We might more accurately say that it uncovers politics. If the policy theorists and. 
analysts discussed here are correct, then the rationalist model is no less political or 
personal; rationalism merely denies and masks its political and personal biases. In 
attempting to maintain the rationalist position, a body of value hierarchies and 
epistemological assumptions are enforced as given truths. Toppling the hegemony of the 
rationalist paradigm has the ' pleasant side effect of unmasking the non-rational and 
emotional bases for decisions made under the guise of the rationalist model. 
Debaters and critics will need to struggle with how these issues can be adjudicated in a 
debate round. Considering critiques as substantive issues removes the easy hierarchy of 
issues that gave critique arguments their trump status, and will require that critics and 
debaters develop more sophisticated practices of comparison and evaluation. Non-policy 
theorists such as Zarefsky may provide some guidance, but much work will have to be done 
in the debate rounds. For value critiques, debaters might advance both a criteria for the 
adjudication of the issues at hand, and a value hierarchy that helps to place the competing 
values in the debate in relation to one another. 
Language and advocacy arguments might be advanced as substantive issues in a debate 
when a team argues that the critic, as a citizen/policy maker, should not specifically endorse 
the other team's advocacy. This could be as philosophical as a moral obligation to not 
engage in or endorse particular communicative behaviors, or as instrumental as a discussion 
of the implications of advocacy for policy implementation and interpretation. Executive 
and judicial bodies often interpret policies based upon the advocacy that advanced them. 
This is especially apparent in judicial attempts to interpret international treaties (Bederman 
972-976; Koh 343). 
Solt may have provided grounds for language and advocacy arguments as substantive 
issues within the policy frame: "If language is so abused that the integrity of the debate 
process has been undermined, then it probably should be a voting issue" ("Demystifying" 
A I 0). If a citizen/policy maker feels that the language choices have impeded effective 
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consideration of the issues, they may opt simply to reject the proposal of the offending 
party. Solt's argument against critiques is that such abuses are uncommon in debate. This 
is not a criticism of the theoretical legitimacy of language critiques, but rather questions the 
common practice of relying upon tenuous links between arguments. 
Ethics violations or critiques that are equivalent to "calling fouls" in the debate "game" 
could also be reconsidered as substantive reasons why a citizen should not endorse a 
particular advocacy. Ethics violations question the reliability and character of the debaters, 
as weIl as all of their arg·umentation. Politically these are powerful arguments. In debate, 
we often remove them from the realm of debatable propositions in favor of having critics or 
tournament administrators adjudicate them independently. In politics they are openly 
discussed and debated and result in political ramifications for propositions, policies, and 
advocates long before any judicial body mandates criminal or civil penalty. If one can 
adequately convince a citizen/policy maker that an advocate of a proposition is lying, it is 
unlikely that the citizen/policy maker wiIl entertain many of the arguments of that advocate. 
Of course, reconsidering critiques as policy analysis is not an unassailable proposition, 
and it may be subject to criticism for its focus on academic policy literature. The theorists 
discussed here include policy analysts and advocates from the RAND Corporation and the 
Cato Institute, and a variety of policy analysis educators and scholars. Their work does not 
comprise the entirety of perspectives on policy analysis, and there are many in the policy 
field who take issue with their positions. However, Dan Durning and Will Osuna do 
provide a quantitative analysis of the perspectives of working policy analysts. They 
conclude not only that most policy analysts are not objective technicians, but also that the 
majority of policy analysts recognize that no policy problem has a single right solution. 
AdditionaIly, the majority of analysts do not believe that a single unified theory of policy 
analysis can explain or solve all policy situations (649). 
It could also be claimed that the model of critiques as policy analysis is unrealistic in 
terms of what a policy analyst must do, which is to convince a client to foIlow their advice. 
While the rational policy model may manifest hegemony in academic debate, such is not 
always the case in policy analysis. Consider some advice from Weimer and Vining: 
"Sometimes doing good simply requires analysts to advise their clients to forgo some 
current popularity or success to achieve some important value. You are doing exceptionaIly 
well when you can convince your client to accept such advice" (408). 
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Just as Weimer and Vining seek to ensure that the training of policy analysts considers 
perspectives other than policy rationalism, so must we as debate educators and critics ask 
ourselves if limiting academic debate to a rationalist perspective pays too high a price in the 
values it sacrifices and messages it sends. If policy debate is to train better citizens and 
political activists, then we must consider the inclusion of value arguments critical to this 
education. Political deliberation rarely relies solely upon instrumental rationality. Even 
given the tendency of some policy analysts to take a predominantly instrumental 
perspective, the inclusion of nonnative value claims is prerequisite to a meaningful and 
compelling justification or dejustification of a policy. Policy rationalism fails for the same 
reason Brownlee and Crossman specifically indicted cost-benefit analysis: "In the attempt 
to replace consent with reason, [it] typically omits vital steps in the debate over values" (I). 
Arguments focused upon value systems are a much-needed corrective to the weaknesses of 
the rationalist policy paradigm (Anderson 31). 
In academic debate, it is critical that the training and experience of the students, 
coaches, and critics include the consideration and evaluation of competing value claims. 
Value conflicts are increasingly central to politics in the United States. Brownlee and 
Crossman note that conflicts between constituencies over regulatory or redistributive 
policies are usually centered around "the absence of a common set of value priorities" (I). 
If debaters, after spending hundreds of hours in the activity, are left with the impression that 
decision making only entails considerations of instrumentalities within the bounds of fonnal 
rules or ethical guides, academic debate will be responsible for proliferating amoral and 
value ignorant policy advocates, and citizens who are ill-equipped to cope with the value-
laden issues of contemporary politics. 
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